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Scientists are enthusiastic about storing carbon in terrestrial sinks and geological reservoirs in 
order to obviate the need for lifestyle-changing reductions in fossil-fuel use. Estimating relative 
costs of various options depends on how permanence is assessed and whether physical carbon is 
discounted. We demonstrate that, in carbon markets, terrestrial sinks credits cannot be traded 
one-for-one for emission reduction credits and the conversion factor would depend on how long 
sinks keep CO2 out of the atmosphere as compared with emission reductions and, discounting 
physical carbon. As a result, the authority could not determine a conversion factor and the 
market would be required to do so. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Scientists and engineers are particularly enthusiastic about the possibility of storing 
carbon in terrestrial sinks and geological reservoirs, thereby creating CO2 offsets that could 
obviate the need for lifestyle-changing reductions in fossil fuel use. (1) Soil scientists claim that, 
by adopting ‘better’ management practices (e.g., zero tillage, improved crop residue 
management), by restoring degraded soils and by converting marginal croplands to permanent 
grasslands or forests, increases in soil organic carbon can offset 20% or more of countries’ fossil 
fuel emissions (e.g., see Lal, 2004a; Lal, 2004b). (2) The Government of Canada (2002) plans to 
rely on tree planting and improved forest management to meet nearly one-third of its Kyoto 
commitment. (3) Proponents of CO2 capture and storage in deep underground aquifers and 
abandoned oil/gas fields indicate that there is enough available storage to trap decades of CO2 
emissions (Parson and Keith, 1998; Gale, 2002; Riahi et al., 2004).  
This enthusiasm needs a reality check. One purpose of this paper is to point out that there 
are some real limits to what may at first glance appear to be a perfectly reasonable approach to 
reducing growth in atmospheric CO2. In particular, we focus on two issues that determine if 
mitigation activities are economically feasible: permanence and the rate at which physical carbon 
is discounted.  
Regarding permanence, there is the question about whether terrestrial carbon storage is 
somehow less permanent than emission reductions as fossil fuels not burned today remain 
available in the future. Most commentators believe that the carbon embodied in trees or 
agricultural soils is always at risk of accidental or deliberate release, and that the CO2 kept in a 
reservoir could leak out at some future time and enter the atmosphere, but that avoided emissions 
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are more permanent. If all mitigation policies are in some sense non-permanent, what then is the 
value of one policy relative to another? How should emerging markets for emissions trading 
value permanence? And how do analysts treat differences in the permanence of mitigation 
activities in cost-benefit analyses that seek to rank alternative policy strategies? While a few 
studies have dealt with this issue (Marland et al., 2001; Sedjo and Marland, 2003; Herzog et al., 
2003; Locatelli and Pedroni, 2004), none have done so in a comprehensive fashion. Further, most 
studies have failed to link permanence with the problem of discounting physical carbon and its 
valuation (Garcia-Oliva and Masera, 2004; Richards and Stokes, 2004). Discounting physical 
carbon is particularly perplexing when carbon offsets and CO2 emission reduction permits are 
tradable and exchangeable, and when carbon offsets are provided on a temporary basis. These 
issues are discussed in detail in the remainder of this paper.  
2.  NON-PERMANENCE OF GHG MITIGATION  
Terrestrial Sinks 
Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities can lead to carbon offset 
credits (or debits). Tree planting and activities that enhance tree growth clearly remove carbon 
from the atmosphere and store it in biomass, and thus are eligible activities for creating carbon 
offset credits. However, there is concern that tree plantations will release a substantial amount of 
their stored carbon once harvested, which could happen as soon as five years after establishment 
if fast-growing hybrid species are planted. 
In addition to forest ecosystem sinks, agricultural activities that lead to enhanced soil 
organic carbon (SOC) and/or more carbon stored in biomass can be used to claim offset credits. 
Included are revegetation (establishment of vegetation that does not meet the definitions of 
afforestation and reforestation), cropland management (greater use of conservation tillage, more 
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set asides) and grazing management (manipulation of the amount and type of vegetation and 
livestock produced). Most of these activities provide temporary carbon offsets only. One study 
reported, for example, that all of the soil organic carbon stored as a result of 20 years of 
conservation tillage was released in a single year of conventional tillage (Lewandrowski et al., 
2004). Likewise, there is concern that soil management practices could be stopped by farmers at 
any time as a consequence of changes in prices and technologies. Finally, given that costs of 
conservation tillage have declined dramatically in the past several decades, it is questionable 
whether the increases in soil organic carbon that result from conservation tillage can be counted 
towards Kyoto targets, simply because they cannot be consider ‘additional’ as they are being 
undertaken by farmers to reduce costs and conserve soil (not to sequester carbon per se).  
Carbon Capture and Storage in Geological Reservoirs 
There is increasing interest in CO2 capture and storage in geological reservoirs (Parson 
and Keith, 1998; Gale, 2002). The storage capacity of depleted gas fields could be around 690 Gt 
CO2, in depleted oil fields 120 Gt CO2, and in deep saline aquifers some 400 to 10,000 Gt CO2 
(Gale, 2002).
1 Compared with current anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions from the use of 
fossil fuels that are about 23 Gt CO2 per year (WRI, 2005), there might be enough capacity to 
store more than a century of CO2 emissions and, perhaps wistfully in an attempt to control 
climate, actually remove CO2 from the atmosphere and store it underground. It is very likely that 
storage in geological reservoirs is more permanent than storage in biological sinks, but how 
permanent is it compared to reducing emissions?  
Since natural gas has effectively been trapped in situ for millions of years, there is no 
reason to think that a gas field could not contain CO2 for a similarly long period (Wildenborg 
                                                 
1 Gale (2002) cites data from the International Energy Agency. 
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and van der Meer, 2002).  If there happens to be some CO2 leakage, it may well be possible to 
take action to fix the problem and prevent further CO2 release. Unfortunately, there currently do 
not exist enough studies to support the degree to which CO2 storage in geological reservoirs 
might be permanent.
2 Ultimately the permanence of any CO2 capture and geological storage 
depends on our ability to manage such reservoirs properly and responsibly.  
Emission Reductions 
While the Kyoto Protocol permits various terrestrial options, particularly ones related to 
biological sinks, its main focus is on the avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions, especially CO2 
emissions associated with the burning of fossil fuels. What are the long-term consequences of 
reducing current fossil fuel use? Some argue that, by leaving fossil fuels in the ground, this only 
delays their eventual use and, as with carbon sequestered in a terrestrial sink, results in the same 
obligation for the future (Herzog et al., 2003). The reasoning behind this is that the price path of 
fossil fuels will be lower in the future because, by reducing use today, more fossil fuels are 
available for future use than would otherwise be the case. However, fossil fuels left in the ground 
may not be used in the future, because, if society commits to de-carbonize the economy, 
behavior may change and technology evolve in ways that reduce future demand for fossil fuels. 
Carbon in terrestrial sinks, on the other hand, always has the potential to be released.  
Permanence remains problematic in the case of emissions because of the different types 
of greenhouse gases and the need to compare them. For example, burning methane emissions 
from landfills not only reduces the amount of CH4 entering the atmosphere (released as CO2 
instead), but might also offset some CO2 emissions if the energy replaces an equivalent amount 
                                                 
2 To address this deficiency, the IPPC intends to release in September 2005 a special report on 
the potential, costs and risks of CO2 storage. Indications are that the report favors the use of 
carbon capture and storage (David Keith, personal communication). 
  4   
of energy from fossil fuel burning. It is known that methane contributes more to global warming 
than carbon dioxide because its potential to trap long-wave heat energy radiated from Earth is 
much greater. However, methane remains in the atmosphere for only 12 years in contrast to CO2 
that stays for hundreds of years. To deal with this, the IPCC employs a global warming potential 
(GWP) for each gas as a simplified means for quantifying the relative abilities of greenhouse 
gases to affect future radiative forcing and thereby the global climate. GWPs are measured 
relative to CO2 and have been updated several times. The GWPs of gases depend on the time 
span or integration time horizon that is chosen for making comparisons. If the integration time 
horizon is 100 years, the GWP of methane is 21, but it is 6.5 if the integration time horizon is 
500 years. In determining the GWP, the IPCC does not discount physical carbon. 
3.  DISCOUNTING PHYSICAL CARBON 
By discounting carbon, one acknowledges that it matters when CO2 emissions or carbon 
uptake occur – carbon removed from the atmosphere today is more important and has greater 
potential benefits than that removed at some future time. Yet, the idea of discounting physical 
carbon is anathema to many who would discount only monetary values. However, the idea of 
weighting physical units accruing at different times is entrenched in the natural resource 
economics literature, going back to economists’ definitions of conservation and depletion 
(Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1968). One cannot obtain consistent estimates of the costs of carbon uptake 
unless both project costs and physical carbon are discounted, even if different rates of discount 
are employed for costs and carbon. This is easy to demonstrate with an example where a project 
involves two or more sources of carbon flux with different time paths (see van Kooten 2004, 
pp.76-77).  
The rate at which physical carbon should be discounted depends on what one assumes 
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about the rate at which the damages caused by CO2 emissions increase over time (Herzog et al., 
2003; Richards, 1997; Stavins and Richards, 2005). If the damage function is linear so that 
marginal damages are constant (i.e., damages per unit of emissions remain the same as the 
concentration of atmospheric CO2 increases), then the present value of reductions in the stock of 
atmospheric CO2 declines at the social rate of discount. Hence, it is appropriate to discount 
future carbon uptake at the social rate of discount. “The more rapidly marginal damages increase, 
the less future carbon emissions reductions should be discounted” (Richards 1997, p.291). Thus, 
use of a zero discount rate for physical carbon is tantamount to assuming that, as the 
concentration of atmospheric CO2 increases, the damage per unit of CO2 emissions increases at 
the same rate as the social rate of discount – an exponential damage function with damages 
growing at the same rate as the social rate of discount. A zero discount rate on physical carbon 
implies that there is no difference between removing a unit of carbon from the atmosphere today, 
tomorrow or at some future time; logically, then, it does not matter if the carbon is ever removed 
from the atmosphere. The point is that use of any rate of discount depends on what one assumes 
about the marginal damages from further CO2 emissions or carbon removals. 
The effect of discounting physical carbon is to increase the costs of creating carbon offset 
credits because discounting effectively results in ‘less carbon’ attributable to a terrestrial carbon 
project. Discounting financial outlays, on the other hand, reduces the cost of creating carbon 
offsets. Since most outlays occur early on in the life of a forest or CO2 storage project while 
benefits of carbon sequestered are spread over time, costs of creating carbon offsets are not as 
sensitive to the discount rate used for costs as to that used for carbon.  
Discounting physical carbon has important implications. For example, discounting 
physical carbon implies that temporary carbon storage is more valuable. Also, by discounting 
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physical carbon, the global warming potential of non-CO2 gases will be different than what it is 
now, which affects the emission inventories of countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol.  
4.  APPROACHES FOR DEALING WITH PERMANENCE 
 The permanence problem could be addressed by providing partial instead of full credits 
for stored carbon according to the perceived risk that carbon will be released from the sink at 
some future date. The buyer or the seller may be required to take out an insurance policy, where 
the insurer will substitute credits from another carbon sink at the time of default. Alternatively, 
the buyer or seller can provide some assurance that the temporary activity will be followed by 
one that results in permanent emission reductions. For example, arrangements can be put in place 
prior to the exchange that, upon default or after some period of time, the carbon offsets are 
replaced by purchased emission reductions. Again, insurance contracts can be used. Insurance 
can also be used if there is a chance that the carbon contained in a sink is released prematurely. It 
is also possible to mark down the number of offset credits by the risk of loss (e.g., a provider 
may convert more land into forest than needed to sequester the contracted amount of carbon).  
Three ‘practical’ approaches to non-permanence of sinks have been discussed in the 
literature. One is to specify a conversion factor that translates years of temporary carbon storage 
into a permanent equivalent. The concept of ton-years has been proposed to make the conversion 
from temporary to permanent storage (Dutschke, 2002; Herzog et al., 2003; IPCC, 2000). 
Suppose that one ton of carbon-equivalent GHG emissions are to be compensated for by a ton of 
permanent carbon uptake. If the conversion rate between ton-years of (temporary) carbon 
sequestration and permanent tons of carbon emissions reductions is k, a LULUCF project that 
yields one ton of carbon uptake in the current year generates only 1/k tons of emission reduction 
– to cover the one ton reduction in emissions requires k tons of carbon to be sequestered for one 
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year.
3 The exchange rate ranges from 42 to 150 ton-years of temporary storage to cover one 
permanent ton.  
Many observers have condemned the ton-year concept on various grounds (Herzog et al., 
2003; Marland et al., 2001). Yet, the concept of ton-years has a certain appeal, primarily because 
it provides a simple, albeit naïve, accounting solution to the problem of permanence. The choice 
of an exchange rate, or, rather, timeframe, is arbitrarily based on rotation length, and is a political 
decision not unlike the choice of GWPs, which facilitated a common CO2-equivalent measure. 
Once an exchange rate is chosen, carbon uptake credits can be traded in a CO2-emissions market 
in straightforward fashion. Yet, the ton-years approach has been rejected by most countries, 
because it disadvantages carbon sinks relative to emissions avoidance (Dutschke, 2002).  
A second approach that has been adopted by the Kyoto Protocol for dealing with CDM- 
afforestation and reforestation projects is the creation of a ‘temporary’ certified emission 
reduction (CER) unit, denoted tCER. The idea is that a tCER is purchased for a set period of time 
(the time between commitment periods of the Protocol) expiring thereafter. Upon expiry, tCERs 
would have to be covered by substitute credits or reissued credits if the original project were 
continued. Compared to ton-years, monitoring and verification are more onerous because a more 
complex system of bookkeeping will be required at the international level to keep track of 
credits. Countries favor this approach over other approaches because they can obtain carbon 
credits early, while delaying their ‘payment’ to a future date.   
A third approach to the problem of temporary versus permanent removal of CO2 from the 
                                                 
3 This interpretation is slightly different from the original intent. The original idea is to count a 
temporary ton as equivalent to a permanent one only if the carbon is sequestered for the full 
period of time given by the exchange rate. The advantage of the interpretation here is that it 
enables one to count carbon stored in a sink for periods as short as one year (as might be the case 
in agriculture). 
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atmosphere is to employ a market device that would obviate the need for an arbitrary conversion 
factor or other forms of political maneuvering. Marland et al. (2001) and Sedjo and Marland 
(2003) propose a rental system for sequestered carbon. A one-ton emission offset credit is earned 
when the sequestered carbon is rented from a landowner, but, upon release, a debit occurs. 
“Credit is leased for a finite term, during which someone else accepts responsibility for 
emissions, and at the end of that term the renter will incur a debit unless the carbon remains 
sequestered and the lease is renewed” (Marland et al., 2001). The buyer-renter employs the 
limited-term benefits of the asset, but the seller-host retains long-term discretion over the asset, 
including responsibility for the liability after the (short-term) lease expires.  
Rather than the authority establishing a conversion factor, the interaction between the 
market for emission reduction credits and that for carbon sink credits can determine the 
conversion rate between permanent and temporary removals of CO2 from the atmosphere. The 
rental rate for temporary storage is based on the price of a permanent energy emissions credit, 
which is determined in the domestic or international market. The annual rental rate (q) is simply 
the market-determined price of a permanent emission credit (P) multiplied by the discount rate 
(r), which equals the established financial rate of interest (if carbon credits are to compete with 
other financial assets) adjusted for the risks inherent to carbon uptake (e.g., fire risk, slower than 
expected tree growth, etc.). Thus, q = P × r, which is a well-known annuity formula. If emissions 
are trading for $25 per t CO2, say, and the risk-adjusted discount rate is 10%, then the annual 
rental for a terrestrial offset credit would be $2.50 per t CO2. Like the ton-year concept, a rental 
scheme makes terrestrial sink projects less attractive relative to emissions reduction. 
Notice that a rental system of the type proposed by Sedjo and Marland (2003) works best 
if we are dealing with credit trading as opposed to allowance trading. Under a cap-and-trade 
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scheme, it would be necessary to set not only a cap on emissions from fossil fuel consumption, 
but also a cap on sinks. In that case, one might expect separate markets to evolve for emissions 
and carbon sink allowances. 
5. SUPPLY OF CARBON OFFSET CREDITS: THE ROLE OF RELATIVE PRICE  
 Consider the case where no climate change mitigation option is permanent. Suppose that, 
if fossil fuels are left in the ground because of a decision to emit less CO2, this action actually 
results in greater emissions in N years. Likewise, CO2 sequestered in a forest or reservoir results 
in its release in n years. What then is the value of a carbon offset credit relative to an emission 
reduction credit? Suppose that a unit of CO2 not in the atmosphere is currently worth $q, but that 
carbon price rises at an annual rate γ < r (see van 't Veld and Plantinga, 2005). Then the value of 
an emission reduction credit is: 
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while an offset credit would be worth some proportion α of the emissions credit, or: 
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The value of ‘temporary’ storage relative to ‘permanent’ emissions reduction depends on 
the discount rate, the time that it takes for a ton of sequestered CO2 to return to the atmosphere, 
and the time it takes for a ton of avoided CO2 emissions to result in higher future emissions 
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compared to not having reduced the emissions today. Notice that it does not depend on the price 
of carbon. As indicated in Figure 1, the proportional value of an offset credit compared to an 
emissions-reduction credit (α) varies depending on the relationship between n and N, the 
discount rate r, and the growth rate (γ) in damages from CO2. It is possible to prove some of the 
more important general findings. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Proposition 1: For fixed and finite N>0, as n/N→0, the value of temporary storage relative to 
permanent emissions reduction goes to zero.  
























































































































.                                                                  (5) 
The reason for the signs is that the natural logarithm of a number less than 1 is negative (recall 
γ<r). Clearly, as the length of temporary storage increases relative to the ‘permanence’ of a CO2 
emission reduction (because of the ceteris paribus condition), the value of a temporary sink 
relative to an emission reduction increases; thus, as n/N→0, α→0. The value of a temporary sink 
decreases as the ‘permanence’ of an emission reduction increases, ceteris paribus, because the 
period of sequestration (n) becomes too small to have any value. This might well be the case for 
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carbon stored in soil due to conservation tillage.  
Proposition 2: An increase in N results in a narrowing of the difference in importance between 
an emissions reduction and a carbon sequestration activity, ceteris paribus. For fixed n/N, an 
increase in N ‘lengthens’ n so that, with discounting, the eventual release of stored carbon (at 
time n) is valued much less today. If N→∞ so that an emission reduction is truly permanent, then 
the value of temporary storage depends only on the length of time that carbon is sequestered.  
Proof: The second term in the denominator of (3) approaches 0 as N→∞, so that the value of a 
temporary sink credit relative to a permanent one depends only on n (as well as γ and r). Since 
storage is not infinite, temporary offsets are still less valuable than permanent emission 
reductions.  
Proposition 3: The value of storage increases with the discount rate, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
The reason that ephemeral activities are more important relative to emission reductions as the 
discount rate increases is because the inevitable release of sink CO2 at some future date is 
weighted much less than the early sequestration. Thus, a policy requiring the use of low discount 
rates for evaluating climate change activities militates against carbon uptake in terrestrial sinks. 
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, which holds for all n, N > 0, n<N, if γ<r. The 
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proof is numerical. Clearly, if n=N, 
r ∂
∂α
=0. Assume r=0.04 and γ =0.02. Then, if n=1 and N=2, 
we find ½ >0.4951; if n=50 and N=100, ½ >0.2747; if n=250 and N=500, ½ >0.0077; and so on.  
Proposition 4: As the rate at which the shadow price of carbon (γ) increases, the value of 
temporary storage relative to a ‘permanent’ emission reduction decreases. This implies, 
somewhat surprisingly, that landowners would supply less carbon when the price of carbon is 
rising over time. The reason is that the supply of offset credits is a positive function of α, and 
∂α/∂γ < 0. Van t’Veld and Plantinga (2005) come to the same conclusion, but their argument 
relies on a strictly concave growth function for trees while the forgoing result requires only that 
the supply of carbon sequestration services be an inverse function of α. 
Proof: Differentiate (3) with respect to γ: 
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.  Denote by S(α,P;Z) the supply of carbon offset credits, where α is the 
relative price of ‘temporary’ versus ‘permanent’ credits (as before), P is a vector of carbon input 
prices and the price of a permanent credit, and Z is a vector of characteristics that describes the 
offset project. Since  0






, S(α,P;Z) shifts up with an increase in the price of carbon 
offset credits relative to emission reduction credits because ∂α/∂γ<0. 
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Proposition 5: The minimum value of a carbon offset credit relative to an emission reduction 
credit equals the ratio of the lifetimes of the ‘temporary’ and ‘permanent’ credits, n/N.  
Proof: Only γ<r is possible because, if γ>r, economic agents would pursue climate mitigation 
(by purchasing carbon credits) to such an extent that the rate of growth in atmospheric CO2 (the 
price of carbon credits) falls enough to equalize γ and r. Thus, consider r→
+γ  and replace in (1). 
Then the value of an emission reduction credit is Nq and from a carbon offset credit is nq. This 
leads that α=n/N. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
Our results have important policy implications, which arise from the non-permanence of 
some policy instruments and the necessity of discounting physical carbon.
4 It is clear that carbon 
offset credits cannot generally be traded one-for-one for emission reduction credits, even if the 
latter are not considered permanent. The conversion rate will depend on the length of time that 
each keeps CO2 out of the atmosphere, and, crucially, on the discount rate. For example, if a 
sequestration project can insure that carbon remains sequestered for 10 years, it is worth only 
0.11 of an emission reduction that ensures no future increase in emissions for 200 years if the 
discount rate is 2%. Given the difficulty of determining not only the discount rate but the 
uncertainty surrounding n and N, it is not possible for the authority to determine a conversion 
factor. Rather, one must rely on the market to determine the exchange rate. While another 
approach might be considered ad hoc, lack of market data for use in cost-benefit analysis 
requires that the analyst make some arbitrary judgments about the conversion rate between 
permanent and temporary removal of CO2 from the atmosphere. While it is possible that carbon 
                                                 
4 Discounting of carbon is not relevant only for integrated assessment of climate change and 
project-based studies, but also for estimating the global warming potentials of non-CO2 gases, 
which, in turn, determine the emission inventories of countries and the way they will allocate 
resources for targeting each gas. 
  14   
prices will be increasing in time, the value of temporary sequestration will be even lower. As a 
consequence, there might be a reduced demand for short-term sequestration. 
While some advocate for the use of low discount rates, we demonstrated that rates can go 
no lower than the rate of increase in global environmental damage resulting from anthropogenic 
emissions of CO2e. When discount rates are set at their lowest value, however, carbon offset 
credits are only worth n/N as much as emission-reduction credits. This implies that ‘temporary’ 
offsets related to biological sink activities are undervalued. 
Finally, it is still uncertain how permanent are the different CO2 storage options. In 
contrast to forestry where trees have been planted and harvested for centuries, there is little 
experience storing CO2 in geological reservoirs and aquifers. While scientists claim that 
reservoirs could store CO2 for centuries, is it possible that capture and storage offers a more 
‘permanent’ option compared to reducing fossil fuel emissions? In principle, the answer is yes, 
because, with the CO2 capture-and-storage option, fossil fuels must be burned beforehand, 
guaranteeing that they will not be burned in the future. In contrast, when renewable energy 
sources replace fossil fuels, there is always a chance that those fossil fuels are burned in the 
future. Further research is needed on this regard.  
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Figure 1: Value of a Temporary Relative to a Permanent Carbon Credit (α), Various 
Scenarios, N=200 